Religious Affairs Office

Pierre Tevanian is a French essayist and activist, and associate professor of philosophy at Seine Saint-Denis (in Drancy). He took part in the round table discussion "Secularisation in the Normative Order of States. The cases of France, India, Canada and the United States" at the conference "Religious Pluralism in a Secular World", organised by the Office of Religious Affairs.

We spoke to him about the model of secularism in France, distinguishing between historical French secularism and more recent trends, which in his view, restrict individual freedoms and target religious minorities, especially Muslims.

To begin with, can I ask you to introduce yourself? Who is Pierre Tevanian?

That’s easy. I’m a secondary school philosophy teacher and essay writer, I run Les mots sont importants (LMSI) together with Sylvie Tissot – a collective that publishes critical analyses and texts on the internet – and I’m also a citizen who’s involved in a variety of campaigns, particularly the struggle against racism.

You’ve been a speaker at the conference on “Politics and Religious Pluralism in a Secular World”, talking about the French model of laïcité, a model that you are highly critical of. What are the distinctive features of this model, and what are your main criticisms of it?

My argument is that what we often call the French model of secularism is not always faithfully presented. What I wanted to demonstrate in my participation in the conferences is that there is no model. Yes, there is a unique French history of the idea and practice of secularism. But what I wanted to emphasise is the fact that there is no single model.

Initially, there was a model that originated at the beginning of the 1880s with the Law Jules Ferry about school and then with the big Law of 1905. There have been major conflicts, different trends, and competing models, and what was imposed, at least in legislative terms, was a model that had already been in existence within the law on schools from the 1880s. My argument is that this model is very different from the one of the 1990s, from the law that has been in place since 2004, and other subsequent legislation and public policies on the subject of secularism. So when we say that the French model is misleading, are we talking about the tradition dating from 1905 that has been dominant for a century? Or are we talking about how things have evolved more recently? What I’m talking about is revolution more than evolution.

So specifically what is it about secular French tradition that falls under the Jules Ferry Law or the 1905 Law? It separates the religious and political authorities, with the aim of establishing the best possible conditions for achieving peaceful, egalitarian coexistence, and preserves freedom of conscience, of worship, of religious expression – and also of non-religious expression – for all citizens on equal terms, accepting the fact that there are people who hold a range of different religious beliefs. This is not unique to France, but it is the spirit of the 1905 law, and also in a sense the spirit of the Jules Ferry law on schools. And it is expressed in a series of laws as that are no doubt the same as those in other countries. However, for me this is not a tradition, a model that is very different from other forms of secularism to be found in other countries. On the other hand what is different is how things have evolved recently.

Recent developments do have a distinctive quality: A secularism that is no longer a principle for the organisation of collective living, but has become a model of identity. I’m developing the idea of “identity secularism”. It is a specific idea, and a critique.

Can I ask you to elaborate on your criticisms of recent developments in laïcité?

My critique is mainly focused on the recent conservative revolution. With regard to the French tradition, it’s not a question of seeing this as set in stone, but I have a good deal of praise for it. I think it’s a heritage that has done French society a lot of good. No doubt there are things that can be criticised in the detail, and in any case there are differences, specific ways of doing things that are not exactly the same in other countries. However, the spirit of the laws regarding schools and the 1905 Law in France is one that I would describe as both libertarian and egalitarian.

We can, however, talk about specifics such as the neutrality of public service providers, because public services benefit all users equally. The obligation of neutrality imposed on public service providers is something that has taken a somewhat different form in France than, for example, in the United Kingdom. In France it is understood that a person’s appearance is included in this need for neutrality. There is also another approach, which I also find acceptable, one that considers that neutrality should not be expressed through physical appearance and clothing, but through the way in which the service is provided, the way in which the public service task is carried out. All users must be treated equally. It’s a different way of conceptualising neutrality in public services. The French approach goes further, by imposing neutrality in terms of appearance on public service providers. Although I find this questionable, I don’t think it’s too serious. However, I do think recent developments that impose neutrality on the users of public services are.

It’s this above all that I’m criticising most strongly, because it’s “liberticidal”. For example, recent developments have a way of maximising or hyperbolising the notion of neutrality. Making it not simply a medium and something related to public space as an arena for citizens to express themselves in different ways, but a kind of principle that takes up much more space in the discourse. From a strictly quantitative point of view, in French secular tradition, the word neutrality, the obligation of neutrality, does not have the importance that is ascribed to it today. The key is the separation of political and religious authorities rather than neutrality. When you separate political from religious authorities, of course this also implies that the apparatus of the state must adhere to a form of neutrality. I defend this neutrality, but what we do today, which is to impose it on people, on individuals, as an obligation, is at odds with the principle of secularism.

A political machine that is supposed to maximise freedom of expression for all citizens, whatever their convictions, becomes the exact opposite. When neutrality is imposed on public space, it essentially means that there is no freedom of expression. Because when you express yourself, you are by definition leaving neutrality behind. So here we have a recent catastrophic – I would even say delusional – evolution of the idea of secularism based on this idea of neutrality in today’s France, which I strongly criticise.

You have recently written that the policies of reaffirmation of laïcité in France, of which the recent “Loi confortant le respect des principes de la République”, also known as the “Loi contre le séparatisme” (24/8/2021), is a good example, are in effect “policies that redefine laïcité”. Could you explain in what sense the current government of Emmanuel Macron is “redefining” laïcité?

The law against separatism and all public policy discourse and practices since the terrorist attacks is a prolongation of this conservative revolution, above all under the previous government. The current administration gives it continuity, some ministers radicalise it, but the trend that emerged in 2004 has not lost momentum, and has to a greater or lesser degree been followed by all governments since then. It consists, for example, of a redefinition and a displacement, an invasion of public life by the principle of neutrality in a way that is completely delusional and “liberticidal”, because it is imposed on individuals, on citizens. Another idea that I have also developed is that it is not only the principle of freedom that is under attack, but also the principle of equality, as this shift clearly does not impact all in the same way. Above all it affects Muslims, a religious minority. Even if there are other victims, such as the Sikhs, this is incidental – does anyone believe that by virtue of this new form of secularism with its laudable concern for equity the appearance of a Father Christmas will be seen as non-secular? Or the wearing of a cross? There may be those who are “anti-racist” or “universalist” who would indeed universalise this redefinition of secularism and impose it on all, but this is not the spirit in which it has been developed, and most of the time it is applied in a biased way. Most of the time it’s implemented in a selective manner, focusing on a stigmatised minority.

How is this apparent in the most recent government in France? First of all, by using the word “secularism” in this way, instead of circumscribing it as a political device that is useful and valuable, but is not the solution to all social problems. But we’re doing quite the reverse, turning it into a kind of panacea that can magically solve every problem. For example, it’s astonishing to see how, after the deadly attacks in France, the question of secularism was raised. This was already the case with François Hollande’s government. In this way, a direct link is drawn between those fatal attacks and a problem of secularism, as if a greater reaffirmation, a better defence of secularism, would protect us from terrorist attacks. As if there were a direct relationship between them. Well, I don’t believe that it’s helpful to look to an infringement of secularism as an explanation in order to understand the monstrosity of such attacks. We’re talking about something else here. It is not the principle of secularism that is being trampled on, but more fundamental aspects of life in society, such as non-violence, the prohibition of murder and the need to resolve conflicts peacefully. I don’t believe that those who carry out these attacks do so due to a simple inability to understand the concept of secularism. There was something abhorrent, something extremely naive in the idea that a solution could be found by better defending secularism in schools. I don’t believe that some people are drawn into this ultra-violent terrorist milieu due to ineffective schooling, or a failure to learn to respect the principal of secularism. It’s abhorrent and very surprising that since those attacks this conservative redefinition of secularism has been turned into a concept that provides us with a way of thinking about everything, and resolving everything.

I’d like to mention another example that illustrates what I’m saying. There are ministers, such as the Minister of Education, who are radical and who are truly entering into the most absurd, violent, brutal, “liberticidal” and anti-egalitarian spiral within the trends I’ve been describing. I’m primarily referring to the Minister of National Education when talking about things such as the drive to make sure that students’ mothers don’t wear a headscarf when accompanying their children on school outings. This is one of his battlegrounds. So far it hasn’t gone ahead, but he has done other things such as campaigning against the wearing of the hijab. More recently there has been a campaign financing a series of posters that are completely delusional with the slogan “this is secularism”, which include all sorts of things that have nothing whatsoever to do with secularism. For example, one of the campaign’s posters says that allowing Mohammed and Sara to swim in the same pool is secularism. There are names that are associated with different religious affiliations, mainly minority ones. There are things like “laugh at the same jokes”. If Sara and Mohammed laugh at the same jokes, it’s down to secularism. Secularism is a word that by being used to cover everything, becomes essentially meaningless.

And the last thing that stands out in recent developments is the way Gérald Darmanin, the current Minister of the Interior, claims to be Napoleon’s heir in his latest book – which is totally absurd because he praises Napoleon without criticising the way that he is represented, or his anti-Semitic language. In fact, this is something rather new, although Éric Zemmour also aspired to be remembered alongside Napoleon. He rewrites French secularism to reflect the way Napoleon managed religion, and that was not at all secular. It makes for a kind of spatio-temporal and conceptual clash. The real point of reference for the concept of secularism is the Law of 1905 and the Jules Ferry law, but he was looking for other, older models that were even more “lliberticidal” and discriminatory; this was the way that Napoleon dealt with religions in general, and particularly the “Jewish question”. A way that was extremely brutal and racist.

In 2013 you published the book The Hatred of Religion: How Atheism Became the Opium of the Left. What, in your opinion, is the general attitude of French left-wing parties towards religion? And more specifically, towards Islam?

I think that overall the French left has a problematic relationship with religion in general, and Islam in particular. Depending on the person in question, it’s either more a question of religion in general, or of Islam in particular – these are two questions that have a certain autonomy. In other words, the French left may have a problem with religion on the one hand, and a problem with Islam on the other, but the latter is not primarily a problem of religion, it is one of racism, the colonial past – all those issues. It would be extremely complex to talk about all the many nuances, but in general terms the answer is yes.

I wrote this book because the problem with religion and with Islam is one that affects a broad range of politicians, from the centre left to the radical left. On the one hand there are a series of racist, Islamophobic prejudices, directly inherited from a colonial culture that has been passed down from generation to generation, and that has never been fully deconstructed. Anyway, from the moment Islam appears on the scene, visible Islam, vindicated Islam, there comes the idea that this represents a danger to women’s rights, that there’s a relationship with violence, etc. These are representations that were constructed and transmitted within the context of French colonialism, and the left was not immune to them.

Furthermore, there is another, different issue that gets added to this. It’s what I call kind of superiority complex that atheists have with regard to those who have not yet “taken the plunge”. This is one of the things I’ve developed in La haine de la religion. I’m calling out for humility, and particularly for an understanding that once someone has “taken the plunge”, or has at least separated themselves from belief in any god, it doesn’t necessarily mean that they have “taken the plunge” and also separated themselves from belief in many other idols. To give an example, merit and talent in success at school. I’m taking this as an example because teachers as a group have strong ties to the left, and are a collective within which this superiority complex is very much present. They are a group within which belief in merit persists, although this has been refuted in works by Bourdieu and others, who have shown that social, economic and other factors also play an important role.

So, if you ask me for a more precise portrait of whether these ideas are more prevalent within the socialist party, among ecologists, communists, anarchists, etc., it’s complex. However, the persistence of Islamophobic representations, and more generally a problematic and somewhat condescending relationship with religiosity overall, cuts across all runs through all left-wing persuasions. People who hold these views and those who oppose them are to be found across most of the political spectrum.

Could this analysis be extended to the context of the European left?

Although I’m not so familiar with all the specific contexts, I’m sure that orientalist, Islamophobic representations exist throughout Europe. They may not have such deep roots as they do in France, and each case needs to be studied individually, but they’re to be found everywhere. The complex relationship between religion and what I call “the atheist superiority complex” is also in evidence. Proof of this lies in the fact that Marx, Lenin, Trotsky and other authors such as Rosa Luxemburg and the philosopher Ernst Bloch, whose work I referred to when writing La haine de la religion, are people who have rightly criticised this rather too unilateral view of religion as something necessarily backward, reactionary, etc. And if these authors, most of whom are German, although some are from other countries, have felt the need to defend this position, it means that its opposite must also have existed within their own context. I have the impression – and it is no more than an impression – that hatred or scorn of religion, and contempt or hatred for Islam (each of which has different roots) are particularly strong in France in comparison with other European countries.